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Discovering War in Chinese History
Peter Lorge
War in China played a signiicant role in the rise and fall of states and 
empires, the personal fortunes of individuals, and developments in science and 
technology. It was therefore extremely consequential in many areas of history, 
inluencing ideas, culture and even the arts. Chinese warfare was neither unique 
nor uniform across its history, of course, making generalizations regarding a 
“Chinese way in warfare” dificult or even deceptive. To further complicate 
matters, the study of Chinese military history has been subject to a number 
of Chinese and Western biases in the 20th and 21st centuries. Finally, the 
discipline of military history has also undergone a series of shifts in practice 
and perspective, some quite recently. Yet China has remained important 
in many debates within military history because its well-documented and 
lengthy history has made it the natural comparison for theories of Western 
development, where China is compared to “the West” as if these were 
equivalent historiographical units.
What most of the modern perspectives, both in the West and China, 
have shared until very recently is their fundamental belief that war was not 
important in Chinese history. China’s political, economic, technological and 
military weakness in the 19th and 20th centuries was projected back onto 
the entire sweep of Chinese history and erroneously transmogriied from a 
military and technological mischaracterization into a fundamental aspect of 
Chinese culture. While China’s scientiic and technological history began to be 
explored, most notably by Joseph Needham, in the middle of the 20th century, 
China’s military history only began to receive the same serious attention 
starting in the 1990s. Chinese military history is therefore an extremely young 
ield that offers the possibility of radically reshaping our understanding of 
Chinese history and culture in general.
The erroneous notion that there is a Chinese way in warfare lies at the heart 
of the misunderstanding of Chinese military history. It is, however, important 
Peter Lorge
22
to distinguish clearly the writing of abstract texts on military thought and the 
intellectual history of those texts from the history of actual warfare at a given 
time and place. Military thought has its own history and its relationship to 
battleield operations is not straightforward. Military thinking in the form of 
texts may lag, directly relect, or be ahead of the military practice of the period 
in which a given text is written. The abstract thinking of one period may or 
may not be relevant to the study of a different period. This is no less true in 
China than anywhere else.
Military history is based upon historical texts recording actual battles, court 
debates on military policy and strategy, archaeology and theoretical texts. Both 
military thought and military history are primarily textually based areas of 
study, but they are not interchangeable. Military thought, based upon a speciic 
corpus of technical works (e.g. Sunzi’s Art of War) is an abstraction; military 
history, based upon historical documents that may include abstract technical 
works is an attempt to understand concrete military aspects of history. I will, 
therefore, explain how Western scholars have come to emphasize Chinese 
military thought rather than military history in their construction of Chinese 
attitudes toward war. I will then discuss changes in both the study of military 
history generally, and Chinese military history particularly, that I believe will 
lead to a new and better understanding of the place of war in Chinese history.
The Chinese way in warfare
The greatest obstacle to understanding the role of war in Chinese history is 
the concept of “the Chinese way in warfare.” This is the ahistorical notion that 
Chinese culture has a single fundamental “way” of war that is and was unique 
and uniform across all time and space. Reduced to Confucius (or Mencius) and 
Sunzi as the civil and martial intellectual exemplars, respectively, of Chinese 
civilization, this essentialist perspective sees civil thinkers as resolutely 
anti-military and military thinkers emphasizing indirection, stratagem and 
limitations. In 1974, Frank Kierman and John Fairbank coedited a volume 
titled “Chinese Ways in Warfare” which was the product of a conference at 
MIT sponsored by Harvard University on Chinese military history. Their goal 
was both reasonable and modest, “to show facets of the Chinese military style 
and tradition,” given that, “Among China’s contributions to today’s world is a 
distinctive military record that had been too little studied.” 1
1. Kierman & Fairbank (1974): 1.
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Fairbank argued in the introduction that China’s history, geography and 
traditions are different from the West and that, consequently, the Chinese way 
of warfare must also be different than the West’s. Quite naturally, he turns to 
the corpus of Warring States Period texts to support his view:
The Sun-tzu (Sunzi) became a classic that summed up the ancient military advisers’ 
accumulated wisdom as to how warfare should be conducted, through what means 
and toward what ends. Placed beside his contemporary the Mencius, the Sun-tzu’s 
emphasis on unsettling the mind and upsetting the plans of one’s opponent obviously 
shares the early Confucian assumption as to the primacy of mental attitudes in 
human affairs. Like the other classics produced by idealists amid the disorder of the 
Warring States, it bequeathed its doctrines to the far different imperial age. 2
Fairbank’s perspective is consistent with a 20th century reading of Chinese 
culture and the role of war in that culture (barring a few notable late 20th 
century scholars). It is not, however, consistent with a pre-20th century reading 
of the texts of Confucius and Sunzi.
Confucius, one of the most important igures in Chinese history, is shown 
in The Analects downplaying the importance of warfare, thus providing a locus 
classicus for anti-military sentiment. The strongest statement against war in 
The Analects is how seldom it presents Confucius discussing it. At a minimum, 
Confucius accepted the need for warfare, but placed it in a subordinate position:
Zigong asked about governing.
The Master said, ‘Simply make sure there is suficient food, suficient armaments, 
and that you have the conidence of the people.’
Zigong said, ‘If sacriicing one of these three things became unavoidable, which 
would you sacriice irst?’
The Master replied, ‘I would sacriice the armaments.’
Zigong said, ‘If sacriicing one of the two remaining things became unavoidable, 
which would you sacriice next?’
The Master replied, ‘I would sacriice the food. Death has always been with us, but 
a state cannot stand once it has lost the conidence of the people.’ 3
War, warriors or the value of military action are only discussed in a few other 
places. In chapter 14 of The Analects Confucius notes in one section that the 
great archer Yi and the great naval commander Ao did not die natural deaths, 
2. Kierman & Fairbank (1974): 5.
3. Slingerland (2003): 128.
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though further on in the same chapter he allows some degree of moral latitude 
for the great minister Guan Zhong because he brought peace to the world by 
making Duke Huan Hegemon. 4 In chapter 15 of The Analects, Confucius states 
that he, “never learned about the arrangement of battalions and divisions.” 5 In 
an unsettled age where war was a constant problem, Confucius sought to bring 
order through morality and proper behavior.
Confucius’ position on warfare has been regarded as both prescriptive and 
descriptive, despite his putative (though now understood to be erroneous) 
editing of The Spring and Autumn Annals, a historical text full of war and 
conlict. 6 By contrast, in the Western tradition, the anti-violence stance of 
a igure like Jesus Christ and dozens of major religious and philosophical 
thinkers of a similar bent has not been used to characterize Western culture as 
non-military. Few Christians would describe their religion as fundamentally 
violent, even when discussing the Crusades. Western scholars can easily 
accommodate the actions of a few medieval European political and religious 
leaders promoting violence in the name of Christianity without changing the 
underlying characterization of Christianity or Western culture as a whole. The 
same does not hold true of China.
In contrast to Confucius, Sunzi, the putative author of a text on warfare 
from approximately the same time period, directly addressed the issues of 
war. Sunzi and the Chinese intellectual tradition of writing about war fairly 
consistently argue against the unthinking and irrational rush to battle. Sunzi 
argues irst and foremost at the very beginning of the text that: “War is a 
great matter of the state, the place of life and death, the way of existence and 
destruction, it cannot not be investigated.” 7 And indeed the irst chapter is 
titled “calculations,” thus insisting upon the importance of thinking about war 
before undertaking a campaign. The Sunzi text as it has come down to us is 
actually arranged logically, and it is no accident that it begins by arguing that 
one must think about war itself. At the same time, however, despite Sunzi’s 
many caveat’s and warnings about warfare, he assumes both that it will happen 
and that it can accomplish certain things. Sunzi is not an advocate for peace 
or against war, he is for waging war intelligently because it is a matter of life 
and death.
4. Slingerland (2003): 155, and 160-161.
5. Slingerland (2003): 174.
6. For Mencius’ comment that Confucius composed The Spring and Autumn Annals, Lau 
(1970): 114.
7. Songben Shiyi Jiazhu Sunzi: 405-406.
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Even if we consider his well-known statement later in the same chapter 
that: “War is the way of cunning,” it is equally apparent that this is further 
reinforcement of his main point. Just as importantly, the commentators 
collected in the 13th century compilation of eleven commentaries on the Sunzi 
felt it necessary to amplify and clarify that relatively clear statement. Their 
commentary is particularly telling given that the subsequent passages in Sunzi 
explains his point about cunning by saying that: “Therefore, able but showing 
that one is unable, acting but showing one is not acting, near but showing one 
is far, far but showing one is near…” To which the commentators add:
Cao Cao: War is without constant coniguration; proceed by deception and cunning.
Li Quan: The army does not reject deception.
Mei Yaochen: Without wiles one cannot use power, without power one cannot 
control the enemy.
Wang Xi: In order to seek victory over the enemy the deceptive must be credible in 
managing the masses.
Zhang Yu: Although benevolence and righteousness are the foundation of using 
troops, their victory must be seized by cunning and deception. Thus, the technique 
of dragging brushwood was Yang Zhuluan’s wiles; Ten thousand crossbows of Qi 
ired in Sun Bin’s unorthodox [plan]; the stampede of a thousand cattle together 
was Tian Dan’s [use of] power. 8 These are all using the way of cunning to control 
victory. 9
These comments break down into two groups. The irst group, Cao Cao, Li 
Quan and Mei Yaochen, insist upon the importance of cunning. By themselves, 
their comments seem banal, merely further supporting Sunzi. The fact that 
they feel it necessary to reinforce Sunzi on this point is, however, telling. 
The reason for their reinforcement is explained in the second group of 
commentators, Wang Xi and Zhang Yu. Both Wang and Zhang explain two 
aspects of command, the moral character of the commander and cunning in 
battleield tactics. The insistence upon cunning is the result of a clash between 
morality and intellect. Moral behavior is not inherently intellectual, and indeed 
is often at odds with rational thought. Prizing survival over morality could be 
seen as rational calculation. Mencius famously put morality above survival, at 
least for the gentleman, seeing it as an existential issue for someone claiming 
to be a gentleman:
8. This is the story of Tian Dan breaking the Yan siege of Jimo, a Qi city, by using a 
stampede of cattle.
9. Songben Shiyi Jiazhu Sunzi: 421.
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Mencius said, “Fish is what I want; bear’s palm is also what I want. If I cannot have 
both, I would rather take bear’s palm then ish. Life is what I want; dutifulness is 
also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would rather take dutifulness than life. On 
the one hand, though life is what I want, there is something I want more than life. 
That is why I do not cling to life at all costs. On the other hand, though death is what 
I loathe, there is something I loathe more than death.” 10
Similarly, Mencius explicitly condemned a ruler seeking “proit [literally 
‘advantage’]” as contrary to good governance. 11
Of course advantage is the basis of military activity. Moreover, where morality, 
credibility, humaneness, righteousness and the like are claimed to be the more 
effective means of leadership, they do not, in and of themselves, cause one’s 
enemies to do what you want. This directly contrasts Confucian ideas of the 
power of morality: “If you desire goodness, then the common people will be 
good. The Virtue of a gentleman is like the wind, and the Virtue of a petty 
person is like the grass-when the wind moves over the grass, the grass is sure 
to bend.” 12 From the Confucian perspective morality is a functional tool to 
win people over to one’s side. Thinking about ways to trick or deceive one’s 
opponent in order to achieve victory is incompatible with simply doing the right 
thing. Thus for the more Confucian commentators like Wang Xi and Zhang 
Yu, their knowledge that one must be cunning and calculating (remember that 
this is a chapter titled “calculations”) to succeed in war must somehow be 
integrated with their irm belief that morality is the basis of leadership.
By contrast, the irst group of commentators is in fact addressing a 
different reader. Wang Xi and Zhang Yu are trying to allay Confucian readers’ 
discomfort with the use of cunning. Our irst group is insisting upon cunning 
not because of issues of Confucian morality, but because of issues of military 
mentality. The irst group relects the fundamental problem of military texts: 
that they are intellectual discussions of a practice, warfare, often populated and 
commanded by men hostile to thinking. Cao Cao and his group are trying to 
convince generals to think carefully about what they are doing and to try and 
outwit their opponents. At the same time, they are making the similar point that 
even if you don’t use your brain, your opponent might. He might outwit you 
and you will lose.
The preceding discussion presents a small number of examples of how 
Chinese thinkers from a variety of perspectives discussed war. They were 
10. Lau (1970): 166.
11. Lau (1970): 49.
12. Slingerland (2003): 134.
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concerned about its effects, and the precedence that a ruler or general might 
give to using force, but they did not oppose war completely or expect that it 
would disappear. Military thinkers argued for careful thinking and emphasized 
the limitations of warfare. At the same time, later commentators read and 
interpreted the signiicance of Sunzi passages in different manners. If Sunzi, 
the paradigmatic foundational text of Chinese military thought, was read and 
understood differently at different times, then it seems impossible that it could 
be taken as a single, constant expression of a Chinese way in war.
Of course, all early written texts on warfare, whether Aineias Tacticus’ 
How to Survive Under Siege, or Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus’ Epitome 
of Military Science are by deinition more considered approaches to ighting. 13 
Given the limited levels of literacy in pre-modern times, and the general 
disinclination of many military men to read much even today, we cannot take 
written discussions of warfare as normative or directly descriptive even for 
their own time. These texts describe a perspective on warfare that was open 
to interpretation. Succeeding generations of readers understood military texts, 
just as they understood religious or philosophical texts, differently at different 
times.
The myopia about anti-military sentiments by Western writers and even 
statesmen or rulers alerts us to the interpretive bias displayed by both foreign 
and Chinese historians concerning Chinese history. Where anti-military 
statements in the West are placed in context, whether religious, philosophical, 
or political, in China any anti-military statement is read transparently as yet 
another afirmation of China’s non-military culture. The far more extensive 
tradition of Chinese military thought is simply disregarded, or interpreted as 
supporting the non-military orientation. Vegetius Epitome of Military Science 
also warns against charging into battle, but this is not used to argue for a 
Western aversion to battle. “For good generals do not attack in open battle 
where the danger is mutual, but do it always from a hidden position, so as to 
kill or at least terrorize the enemy while their own men are unharmed as far 
as possible.” 14 Since Chinese history does not appear to have been any less 
warlike or any more peaceful than that of any other place, it would be hard to 
argue that China’s culture is signiicantly more non-military than the West’s if 
one was aware of China’s extensive military history.
13. Aineias the Tactician, How to Survive Under Siege; Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, 
Epitome of Military Science. We might also include Fontinus’ Strategems, Aelian’s 
Tactics, and Modestus’ On terms of military science.
14. Vegetius, Epitome, 80.
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Ignorance of China’s military history is therefore a necessary precondition 
for these misconceptions. Conversely, knowledge of Chinese military history, 
putting war back into China’s history, undermines the notion of China as a 
non-military or anti-military culture. This is not to say that China did not have 
a long, extensive and rich history of writers and thinkers opposed to war. Most 
ordinary Chinese people preferred to live in peace. But this was true in the West 
as well, along with the rest of the world. The centrality or distinctiveness of 
this myth of China’s non-military culture in some people’s conception of what 
Chinese culture is must be re-evaluated in light of its actual military history.
Texts on war and war itself
Fairbank was explicit in positing a different Chinese approach to warfare, 
and, of course, Basil Liddell Hart had used Samuel Grifith’s translation of 
Sunzi to support his own “indirect method” by claiming it was consistent with 
ancient Chinese practice. 15 For people like Hart, Sunzi was another thinker 
to enlist in his campaign against Clausewitz, whose thinking he blamed for 
the carnage of World War One. Hart’s interpretation of Sunzi as arguing for 
an indirect method generally persists in the Western view of both Sunzi and 
Chinese warfare overall. The Sunzi versus Clausewitz paradigm created a neat 
indirect Chinese versus direct Western schema. Of course Clausewitz’s On 
War was published posthumously in 1842, making his supposed direct method 
a relatively recent and modern approach. It would take a classicist to connect 
Clausewitz’s direct method to ancient Greece and thus make it a fundamental 
characteristic of western warfare.
Victor Davis Hanson, a classicist, forcefully argued in his 1989 book The 
Western Way of War for the idea that there is a speciically Western way of 
war stemming from the particular mode of ancient Greek hoplite warfare. 16 
The western way of war was connected to the “Great Hoplite Narrative” 
whereby the birth of hoplite warfare in ancient Greece led to the invention of 
democracy. 17 Like the simpliied characterization of Chinese culture as non-
military based upon the reading of Warring States Period texts, The Western 
Way of Warfare attempted to prove that because ancient Greeks fought in a 
particular manner, all subsequent Western armies fought that way, at least when 
they were successful. The ones that were unsuccessful did not ight that way.
15. Grifith (1963): vi-vii.
16. Hanson (1989).
17. For the “Great Hoplite Narrative,” see Kagan & Viggiano (2013): xi-xiv.
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The Ancient Greek case that Hanson uses to argue for a Western way of 
war is not based upon theoretical texts like the Sunzi or even Aineias Tacticus’ 
How to Survive Under Siege. This was not a methodological choice, but 
rather something forced upon him by the overall lack of extant Ancient Greek 
texts on military thought. Hanson turned to archaeology, some histories, and 
visual evidence from pottery to prove his case. Generations of classicists have 
devoted immense effort to trying to understand how the ancient Greeks fought, 
with considerable creativity and conjecture used to connect the fragmentary 
evidence. Hanson’s position was that democratic, yeoman farmers preferred 
to ight brief, sharp and direct battles with similarly armed yeoman farmers 
in head on infantry clashes that would be quickly resolved. Thus, in the West, 
Hanson believes, direct, head on warfare was stressed. Also, since this was, 
in his opinion, the most effective way of warfare, the West defeated non-
Westerners in battle for the rest of history because its “classic” mode of warfare 
just happened to be the best way to ight.
Leaving aside the many obvious weaknesses of such an argument, and 
recent scholarship that has completely undermined Hanson’s characterization 
of hoplite warfare and its social context, the Western way of warfare thesis 
reduced Western warfare into an ahistorical abstraction similar to that of 
the Chinese way in war. 18 Hanson’s thesis also neatly dovetails with Hart’s 
position on Clausewitz, reinforcing it and, by extension, Hart’s reading of 
Sunzi, since China is the paradigmatic counterpoint to the West. Both the 
military characterization of the West and the military characterization of China 
are poorly founded in data on virtually every level, from textual analysis 
to historical events, but they remain compelling for the simplicity of their 
schema. Hanson’s argument has not been very inluential in the broader ield of 
western military history outside of his own writings, popular general texts, and 
the speciic area of ancient Greek military history. This is probably because 
western military history is well provided with detailed studies that do not ind 
his work relevant to other times and places.
The notion that there is a Chinese way in war or way of war has been 
extremely inluential. This is true both in Chinese studies and in comparative 
studies of warfare. Unlike the military history of the west, Chinese military 
history is quite poorly studied. Even after the publication of Chinese Ways in 
Warfare, very few military histories for any period of Chinese history were 
published. In contrast, many people published translations of Sunzi. Most 
translators provided only very general overviews of the meaning of Sunzi 
and tended to follow the Fairbank/Hart lines of a different and indirect way 
18. For the new scholarship see, Kagan & Viggiano (2013).
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interpretation of Sunzi. 19 Thus a particular interpretation of one, albeit central, 
text was substituted for the lack of histories.
John Keegan, one of the great popular military historians of the later 
20th century and a strong supporter of Victor Davis Hanson, based his 
characterization of Chinese military practice on a narrow reading of Sunzi, 
and described Sunzi’s principles as: “all concepts recognized to be profoundly 
anti-Clausewitzian by twentieth-century strategists, when the campaigns of 
Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh drew Sun Tzu to their attention.” 20 Keegan 
relies for this characterization on Chen Ya-tien’s, Chinese Military Theory. 21 
Chen’s book was primarily concerned with explaining the military theories of 
Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in the 20th century, but he did devote part 
of his book to introducing classical Chinese military thought. Regardless of the 
limited value of that introduction itself and the work’s drawbacks, it is clearly a 
text on, as it states in its title, military theory. It is Keegan who then extends his 
reading to place it in opposition to Clausewitzian concepts (It is worth noting 
that Keegan was extremely hostile to Clausewitz, so he perhaps thought that 
he was praising the Chinese).
Keegan goes on to discuss Fairbank’s “Chinese Way of Warfare” while 
accurately citing the title of the book as Chinese Ways in Warfare in his notes. 22 
The move from Fairbank’s plural “ways” to Keegan’s singular “way” is not 
hard to justify from Fairbank’s introduction, but it is still clear that Fairbank 
was attempting to bring coherence to a set of chapters unconnected in time and 
disparate in conclusions. Hence the “ways” of Chinese Ways in Warfare were 
the individual chapters rendering sample pieces of China’s military history. 
Abstracted through Fairbank’s introductory lens, however, they became 
support for a simpliied explanation of that same history.
At no point, however, do Keegan or Fairbank prove a connection between 
military thought and military practice. Both assumed that practice followed 
theoretical texts, or that theoretical texts simply relected actual practice. 
Fairbank, as quoted above, imagined that Sunzi was the distillation of the 
wisdom of ancient Chinese warfare. While it might be possible to argue that 
practice followed theoretical texts at some time and place with some speciic 
text or texts, proving it would required evidence linking thought and practice. 
19. See Alastair Iain Johnston’s telling remark that, “In large measure the problems of this 
literature stem from a heavy reliance on Sun Zi’s Art of War as the textual basis of 
Chinese strategic culture.” Johnston (1995): 26.
20. Keegan (1993): 202.
21. Chen Ya-tien (1992): 21-30.
22. Keegan (1993): 214.
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And even if it could be proven in a speciic instance, that proof could not 
be generalized to all of Chinese history and all military texts without further 
event-by-event and text-by-text proof.
The prerequisite for a proof of a connection between theoretical texts and 
military practice would be a comprehensive, deep and high-quality analysis of 
the entire corpus of the texts of Chinese military thought, and a similar quality 
account of Chinese military history, including battle accounts, court strategy 
debates and so on. Absent these prerequisites, it is methodologically unsound, 
or at least a highly tenuous process, to attempt to connect military texts and 
actual military practice. Given the current state of the ield, such a standard 
effectively precludes any such activity for many years to come.
Left unsaid in all of these discussions are a number of highly signiicant 
problems. There is no proposed or accepted deinition of who is “Chinese” and 
who is not, what territory we should consider “China” and what is foreign, or 
even which dynasties are Chinese. Joanna Waley-Cohen, for example, showed 
very clearly that the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty strongly emphasized 
their martial accomplishments. 23 With regard to the texts and their audience, 
we have no sense of the role of literacy in connecting texts to practice, or even 
how accessible military texts were to generals. Lastly, we do not know what 
was contained in the hundreds of no longer extant texts.
All of these problems highlight the dificulties of proving a clear connection 
between theory and practice. Even without these considerations, there is no 
particular reason to expect a single Chinese way in war, at least at an abstract 
level, instead of changes in military practice, different practices among 
different ethnic groups and even shifts at different stages in a dynasty’s life 
cycle. Rather than assume that a single way of warfare is natural, the opposite 
is more likely. There is no single philosophical tradition in China, so we should 
not assume that there is a single strand of military thought.
One way to resolve these issues would be to deine being Chinese by 
adherence to a circumscribed manner of warfare. Those who ight in a particular 
way are Chinese, and those who do not are not Chinese. More narrowly, we 
might deine Chinese people as those who perceive and write about war in 
a “Chinese” way. Both of these deinitions would require us to place a way 
of ighting or thinking about war at the center of Chinese identity or culture. 
Even if we were willing to take such a bizarre position, it might still run into 
dificulties in distinguishing between groups within Chinese society. Since 
Chinese society has never been uniform and monolithic at even a single point 




farmers, city dwellers, literati, merchants, and so on. Different attitudes would 
also distribute across the landscape as people living in border areas might well 
perceive warfare differently than those in the interior. Relying upon what was 
written alone subjects us to intellectual and rhetorical traditions, as well as the 
political and military circumstances of the writer.
Setting aside the current impossibility of a comprehensive approach to the 
problem, there are two alternative approaches worth arguing for, or at least 
searching for, a single Chinese way of warfare. Both are effectively shortcuts, 
or efforts to resolve the question of a Chinese way in war without complete 
information. One approach would be to ind a consistent abstract approach to 
warfare in Chinese military texts. This was the method used by Alastair Iain 
Johnston in his 1995 book, Cultural Realism. 24 The other approach would be 
to analyze a sample of Chinese military history and ind a consistent strategic, 
operational or battleield practice across time in different Chinese dynasties. 
This was the method used by Yuan-Kang Wang in his 2011 book, Harmony 
and War. 25
Johnston and Wang are both political scientists so their approaches to the 
question of a Chinese way in warfare are driven by the methodological and 
functional demands of their ield. Their books fall on either side of the question 
of whether culture matters in decision-making and international relations, or 
whether all people make rational choices to maximize their expected returns 
regardless of culture. In functional terms, their work attempts to describe 
the Chinese way in warfare in such a way that it assists predictive models 
of Chinese military behavior. As a social scientiic endeavor both works 
assume fundamentally that some sort of unifying, consistent process must be 
at work, even if what we currently believe may be proven wrong. None of 
this is important to the historical examination of Chinese ways in warfare, 
which does not require a simple “scientiic” answer and has no predictive 
requirement. Thus, while Johnston and Wang’s books are important because 
they contribute to the general debate, they are works of political science that 
unsurprisingly fail in the historical realm.
Johnston’s Cultural Realism is based upon an analysis of The Seven 
Military Classics and the grand strategic preferences of the Ming dynasty 
against the Mongols. He concludes that Chinese strategic culture is, “-rooted 
in historically constructed and socially learned assumptions about the strategic 
environment and appropriate responses to it.” 26 While Johnston is surely 
24. Johnston (1995).
25. Yuan-Kang Wang (2011).
26. Johnston(1995): 28.
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correct in his overall position, his analysis relies upon a careful analysis of The 
Seven Military Classics to abstract a model of Chinese strategic preferences. 
Despite his excellent historical discussion of the creation of The Seven Military 
Classics, he is unaware of the very speciic strategic context under which The 
Seven Military Classics was compiled. 27 Only the texts attributed to Sunzi 
and Wu Qi were unquestionably classics before the completion of The Seven 
Military Classics in 1083. The other ive texts only became classics after their 
inclusion in the compilation.
The choice of texts included in The Seven Military Classics as well as 
their particular ordering within the manual argued for a strategy of limited 
warfare and the subordination of military oficers to civil control. A distinctly 
Confucian bias is evident in the manual, which is not surprising when we 
consider that it was created to educate oficers in both strategy and loyalty. The 
Seven Military Classics was a manual of military thought created by a civil 
bureaucracy for a stable dynasty that could not expect to make major territorial 
gains. It was not a manual for establishing a dynasty. Johnston points out that 
The Seven Military Classics was extremely inluential after the Song, both as 
part of a military education system in the Ming dynasty, and as the core reading 
on military thought for civil oficials. This is an important point that argues 
that the particular late 11th century Song dynasty court bias in military thought 
became an important, possibly dominant, strand of Chinese military thought in 
the succeeding centuries.
Johnston does not stop at distilling grand strategic preferences from The 
Seven MilitaryClassics; he tests those preferences against the actions of the 
Ming dynasty court. Johnston inds a second important strand of military 
thought that he terms “Mencian” in reference to the Confucian philosopher 
Mencius. This strand of thinking posits that war is the result of internal moral 
failings at court. It has rhetorical power, but is not operational. Johnston’s work 
on The Seven Military Classics fails because it assumes both that the text fairly 
represents all of Chinese military thinking, and that the interpretation of the 
larger text and its constituent parts was not subject to change. His analysis of 
the Ming court’s decisions fails because it assumes that policy decisions are 
purely based upon preferences generated by military thought. Many of the 
policy decisions at the Ming court, as with those of other dynasties, were made 
because of internal political considerations. This was true in military policy 
and civil policy.
27. Johnston’s position is consistent with that of the Chinese scholarship he relied upon for 
the creation and meaning of The Seven Military Classics.
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In sharp contrast to Johnston, in Harmony and War Yuan-Kang Wang 
analyzes the military history of the Song and Ming dynasties and concludes 
that both dynasties practiced realpolitik military policies. Wang’s methodology 
is sounder than Johnston’s, but his conclusions less supportable. He inds that 
the Song and Ming courts made decisions in line with a structural realist 
approach to military policy unaffected by Confucian culture. This is to say 
that emperors and statesmen evaluated the costs, risks, beneits and chances of 
success for military action in deciding what policies to pursue. While Wang is 
correct in discounting the notion of a non-military Chinese culture, his removal 
of culture entirely substantially misreads court debates.
Wang does an admirable job of grasping the secondary historical scholarship 
on the military histories of the Song and Ming dynasties. As with Johnston, his 
social science approach requires him to ind a single, consistent way of making 
policy decisions across centuries. This requirement must either elide those 
decisions that clearly were affected by culture, or rationalize that decision-
making was on average based upon structural realist principles. Any cultural 
concerns expressed by statesmen and rulers must be taken as mere window 
dressing on the core realist arguments. It is one thing, however, to argue that 
policy makers were intelligent and rational when making momentous decisions 
for the dynasty. It is quite another to argue that their culture and their cultural 
values did not play a signiicant role in their decisions.
For political scientists, the signiicance of Wang’s work is that it allows 
analysts to evaluate current Chinese policies through structural realism. 
Chinese leaders are rational actors who make decisions in the same manner 
as rational leaders in other countries. The challenge is only to understand 
their motivations rather than their values. By this reading, the Chinese are 
not inherently anti-military, defensive-minded, or passive. They simply try, 
objectively, to get the best deal they can out of the circumstances.
For Wang, changes in culture, different interpretations of texts, or the 
shifting priorities of a dynasty over its lifespan are irrelevant. The key point 
is that Chinese leaders are always structural realists just as structural realist 
theories posit. This assumption also means that Wang can generalize from his 
historical sample without needing to be comprehensive. With a large enough 
sample size he can credibly extrapolate for all of Chinese history.
Both Johnston and Wang’s arguments are partly correct. Chinese statesmen 
were not inherently or culturally anti-military, defensive-minded or passive. 
But culture did and does matter. Not just history and military texts affected 
policy decisions, but also the perception of history and military texts. Just as 
signiicantly, neither Johnston nor Wang resolves the matter of what constitutes 
China or Chinese culture. Ming political and military culture was deeply 
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affected by Mongol culture. Ming military policy focused on the Mongol 
threat for most of the dynasty, but was brought down by a new Manchu power. 
Ming efforts to put down internal rebellions failed in the late Ming dynasty, but 
much of that was due to vicious partisan politics at court.
Inaccurate generalizations about a Chinese way in war have been repeated 
and reiied by repeated translations of texts of Chinese military thought, 
particularly Sunzi, and the basic social science demands of political science. 
John Fairbanks’ need to generalize about Chinese warfare in the introduction 
of Chinese Ways in Warfare matched the needs of non-specialists like John 
Keegan for a single, short, clear characterization. Once thus simpliied, Chinese 
warfare could be safely ignored, and its long history set aside. Similarly, 
Chinese military thought was simpliied into a single, unchanging position. 
Functionally then, the idea of a Chinese way in warfare is an intellectual and 
methodological dead end.
Military history
If we are to discover the role war played in Chinese history we must set 
aside the search for a single Chinese way of warfare. Chinese military historians 
have already begun applying the discipline of military history developed in 
Western scholarship to the study of Chinese history. This development has 
been extremely fruitful in recent research, and has in turn brought Chinese 
military history into the current debates within the discipline of military 
history. In many respects, Chinese military history has been more accepted 
and more inluential in the ield of military history than in the ield of Chinese 
history, though that is also changing. 28 The major insight that Chinese military 
history adds to global military history, Western military history and Chinese 
history is that war was also signiicant in China. This new research on Chinese 
military history is now contributing to ongoing changes in the discipline of 
military history as it moves away from its purely Western roots.
The study of Chinese military history has also contributed to two major, 
very recent, shifts in military history, involving the Western Way in Warfare 
thesis and the Military Revolution thesis. In order to contextualize these 
changes, and to lay out the current advances in Chinese history, in this section I 
28. The reasons for the different receptions are not clear. Partly it is simply due to the 
individuals involved, partly to the speciic interest of certain prominent military 
historians like Geoffrey Parker, Jeremy Black, and Stephen Morillo, in using a broader 
range of comparative examples.
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will irst provide a brief overview of some relevant aspects of western military 
history. I will then turn to Chinese military history, and its future possibilities.
The study of military history has changed markedly over the 20th century, 
with new methods, approaches and areas of study emerging up through the 
beginning of the 21st century. Hans Delbrück (1848-1929), one the founding 
fathers of modern military history, sought not only to determine what 
happened on the battleield, but also how it was connected to society. While 
much of what Delbrück had to say about that connection now seems dated, his 
military analysis remains inluential. Perhaps his most important contribution 
was his argument that there were two poles of military strategy, attrition 
(ermattungsstrategie) and annihilation (niederwerfundsstrategie). Delbrück 
claimed to have extracted or derived these concepts from a careful reading 
of Clausewitz. Regardless of whether these concepts were, indeed, incipient 
in Clausewitz, they still provide a useful framework for approaching strategy 
and tactics. Most of the Zhou-Song conquest of China in the 10th century, 
for example, was a struggle to annihilate the armies of the various polities of 
southern and western China, while those polities often sought to slow down the 
campaigns and blunt those offensives through attrition.
Some of the things that Delbrück stressed in his research, like determining 
the actual numbers involved in a battle, often using real world constraints to 
overturn textual claims (sachkritik), became basic to the practice of military 
history. Arden Bucholz has described the inluence on Delbrück’s approach, 
“Like Hegel and Goethe, both essential to his education, Delbrück seldom lost 
the larger humanistic perspective. From Ranke, Delbrück carried forward a 
concern for historical realism and an understanding of the rigorous, explicit use 
of eye-witness primary accounts-often used against each other to ind out “what 
really happened.” 29 Yet Delbrück’s approach was not generally acceptable: 
“All his life, Delbrück stood on the middle ground, with the military criticizing 
him as an outsider who presumed to read the law to the oficers in their own 
domain, and university colleagues rejecting the study of war as intellectually 
illegitimate.” 30 In many respects, very little has changed for military history.
There was little, however, in the way of speciically military history 
methodology, as distinct from historical methodology, for most of the 20th 
century. Indeed, it might be fair to say that there was little in the way of 
military history before World War Two; the history of wars was simply part of 
29. Bucholz (1985): 170-171.
30. Bucholz (1985): 171.
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regular history writing. 31 The few military histories that were available were 
later criticized as “drum and bugle history,” because they emphasized the glory 
of war and battle. At the same time, the usually prominent place of wars in 
many general histories led many to believe that most “traditional” history was 
really military history. This has also been relected in a perception that military 
history has traditionally been taught at American colleges and universities until 
anti-war protesters in the 1960s began to drive it from the curriculum.
There is no generally accepted deinition of what constitutes military 
history, perhaps because few if any scholars who deine themselves as military 
historians are particularly concerned with the issue. 32 While the history of a 
war, military campaign or army seems unquestionably to belong to the category 
of military history, other areas are less clear. Civil-military relations, war and 
memory (how wars are remembered or commemorated), war in cinema, and 
technology often straddle the edge of military history. An area like strategic 
thought may not really be a historical topic, even if it is a military topic. Of 
course, Clausewitz’s writings on war and his strategic thinking profoundly 
inluenced the writing and understanding of military history.
Clausewitz argued that, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means,” drawing a direct connection between a state’s use of force against 
another state and foreign policy goals. 33 He did not remark upon the internal 
political use of war as a means of legitimation or its value in factional struggles. 
His basic position that war was a rational instrument of state policy was 
generally accepted until the latter half of the 20th century. At a minimum, most 
historical studies of warfare assumed that states waged war in a purposeful 
way, even if they did not cite Clausewitz’s dictum to support that stance. This 
was not true outside of the ield of history, where anthropologists, for example, 
dealt with war more with respect to social evolution, ethnicity and social 
violence. 34
At the same time, a number of historians began studying war in new ways, 
perhaps most iconically for what some would call the “New Military History,” 
Donald Engels’ Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian 
Army. 35 This shift was not always welcomed, with Peter Paret complaining that 
31. A signiicant number of ancient Greek and Roman histories devoted large sections to, 
or were entirely concerned with, military history. Foundational historical texts like 
Herodotus and Thucydides made war a basic part of history in the West.
32. For two prominent exceptions see Black (2004), and Morillo (2006).
33. Clausewitz (1976): 87.




the New Military History “minimizes or even excludes the subject of combat.” 
It is an approach where “we are asked to pay greater attention to the interaction 
of war with society, economics, politics and culture. The New Military History 
stands for an effort to integrate the study of military institutions and their 
actions more closely with other kinds of history.” 36 John Keegan, for his 
part, forcefully opposed Clausewitz’s position, arguing for a more “cultural” 
approach to war. 37 Victor Davis Hanson seconded Keegan’s position in The 
Western Way in War. 38 Hanson argued more than just that war was a cultural 
act, but that the Western way of waging war that stemmed from the Ancient 
Greek approach to battle was a superior mode of warfare.
These different perspectives all try to move beyond a narrow focus on 
the battleield. For a historian like Keegan or a classicist like Hanson, war is 
just part of culture and those searching for a rational explanation of war are 
misguided. 39 War is a meaningful cultural act that serves cultural purposes, 
not the rational pursuit of state interests. Of course, the notion that states exist 
and have interests was not accepted uniformly across all times and cultures. 
Clausewitz could assume this because it was true in his time and place. At 
the same time, however, Clausewitz was not trying to conine his conclusions 
about war as a historical phenomenon to only his own time; he sought to 
explain it as a universal process.
Keegan and Hanson’s cultural arguments were tightly tied into the notion 
of ways in warfare, as we have discussed above. Their focus also emphasized 
the individual experience of war and combat over strategy and politics. This 
was consistent with a more general “cultural turn” in the humanities that was 
mostly ignored as a theoretical orientation by military historians. 40 The notable 
exception to this was John Lynn, who speciically sought to bring military 
history into the cultural turn and bridge the culture versus Clausewitz debate. 
Lynn argued in his 2003 book, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, that 
36. Paret (1991): 10.
37. John Keegan(1993): 3-12.
38. Hanson (1989): xv-xix.
39. Inherent in the notion of a rational reason for war is the possibility that war can be 
avoided when all sides understand that wars are actually more costly than other 
solutions to conlicting interests.
40. Keegan and Hanson’s anti-Clausewitzian position its in well with the cultural turn, 
which came to prominence in the 1970s, though neither of them explicitly cited any 
of the relevant foundational texts. Keegan discusses anthropology only with respect 
to the insights it offers for primitive warfare, and only works concerned with warfare. 
Keegan (1993): 84-94.
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war was partly rational and partly cultural. 41 Just as importantly, Lynn provides 
a model for the interaction of, as he puts it, the “Discourse on War” and the 
“Reality of War.” 42
These advances in theorizing war, or at least examining the discipline of 
military history, were sometimes accompanied by the addition of the military 
histories of non-Western cultures. Where a thinker like Clausewitz had sought 
universal knowledge through theorizing about Western military history and 
the warfare he had just personally experienced, John Keegan, Geoffrey Parker, 
Jeremy Black, Stephen Morillo and John Lynn, to name some prominent 
examples, used the military histories of non-Western cultures to universalize 
their arguments. These new, non-Western histories began quickly to erode the 
ways in warfare approach.
There is a natural chronological break between the works of Parker and 
Keegan, and the other authors. Both Parker and Keegan were entirely under 
the inluence of the ways in warfare understanding of China, and their works 
relect that. Black, Morillo and Lynn, while not entirely separated from the 
inluence of the ways in warfare perspective, offer much more nuanced 
positions, in some instances trying to balance the earlier understanding with 
an obvious discomfort with making sweeping generalizations based on weak 
evidence. 43 New publications on Chinese military history in the 21st century 
have made it impossible simply to generalize from reading a translation of 
Sunzi. In 2002, David Graff and Robin Higham edited A Military History of 
China, and David Graff published Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900, the 
latter the most important book on Chinese military history in the West since 
Chinese Ways in Warfare. 44 Tellingly, Graff’s monograph was published in a 
series edited by Jeremy Black.
This brings us to our second major issue, the Military Revolution 
hypothesis, irst proposed by Michael Roberts and then altered and ampliied 
in importance by Geoffrey Parker. The Military Revolution hypothesis 
argued that the adoption of gunpowder weapons, both handguns and cannon, 
stimulated military change in Europe between 1500 and 1800 that led to the 
rise of the early modern nation state. The Military Revolution hypothesis is 
also connected to the question of why China fell behind the West in military 
41. Lynn (2003): 319.
42. Lynn (2003): 331-341.
43. See for example Morillo (2006): 20-21, where he tries to reconcile characterizing 
Chinese culture as anti-military through Sunzi by also mentioning Sima Qian’s 
perspective.
44. Graff & Higham (2002b). Graff (2002a).
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capability. Joseph Needham, the pioneering scholar of Chinese science and 
technology, posed the question in a broader way to include all science and 
technology, causing some to call this “the Needham question.” Needham’s 
response to this problem was to publish as much as he could on what had 
hitherto been the unknown but extensive, deep and long history of science 
and technology in China. Ultimately, Needham argued that while China did 
invent the true gun, it did not really exploit it the way the West did because the 
Chinese were anti-military by nature.
Needham’s assertion of China’s fundamental anti-military culture and the 
massive volume he wrote on gunpowder and gunpowder weapons bolstered 
the existing Western perspective that, while China invented gunpowder, it 
never really used it for war. 45 It was only in the West where the real value of 
gunpowder was realized and that this explained why guns only developed in 
Europe. Needham was strongly motivated to prove that gunpowder had, indeed, 
been invented irst in China and not independently in Europe. He succeeded 
in proving the Chinese origin for gunpowder without effectively explaining 
why guns developed so much further in Europe by the 16th century. Yet as 
even Needham recognized, the Chinese had not just invented gunpowder, they 
had also invented the gun and used it in battle. Indeed, many of the sources 
Needham had used to prove that China was the irst to invent gunpowder 
were military manuals. The supposedly anti-military Chinese literati had been 
responsible for composing and publishing a far longer and more extensive 
tradition of military manuals, works on strategy, and military encyclopedia 
than anywhere else in the world.
Kenneth Chase suggested another reason for China’s slower development 
of the gun in his 2003 book, Firearms: A Global History to 1700. 46 According 
to Chase, it was the particular circumstances of warfare in the rest of the world 
that made guns less functional in battle than in Europe. Functionally, Chase 
removed the ways in warfare or cultural anti-militarism in favor of the practical 
realities of the speciic battleield problems of a given group. Chase also undercut 
the notion that history is driven by technology. As Bert Hall pointed out in his 
review of Chase’s book, “Gunpowder is usually seen as the paradigm case 
where a dramatic shift in weaponry, representing humankind’s irst attempt to 
harness chemical energy directly, becomes the prime mover behind sweeping 
historical changes.” 47 If historical and geographic circumstances powerfully 
45. Needham (1986): 14. Needham argued against this erroneous Western idea but, judging 
by much of the literature that followed, unsuccessfully.
46. Chase (2003).
47. Hall (2005): 338.
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affect the use of technology then the use of technology is a relection of those 
conditions, not a driver of action.
My own 2008 book, The Asian Military Revolution, took up where Chase 
left off, both arguing that culture drives technology and engaging one of the 
main tenets of Parker’s military revolution thesis, that guns caused the rise 
of the modern nation state. Guns were invented under the Song dynasty, a 
centralized, bureaucratic government with a standing army, but other polities 
and groups across Asia absorbed guns into their own circumstances in very 
different ways. 48 Technology is invented in one place and received everywhere 
else, but this is not a unidirectional low. Improvements and new inventions 
circulate as needs and means require. There is no simple point and diffusion 
model and no single logical response to a given technology.
A great example of the clash between different modes of warfare is provided 
by Kenneth Swope in his 2009 book, A Dragon’s Head and A Serpent’s Tail: 
Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598. Swope shows the 
military history of Chinese cannon centered warfare against Japanese lintlock 
centered warfare in Korea at the end of the 16th century. 49 At a minimum, 
Swope demonstrates that guns were extensively used in East Asia long before 
the West opened up an enormous technological lead. The Japanese used copies 
of European muskets that they readily and eagerly brought into their battleield 
operations. Cannon and handguns continued to play important roles in East 
Asia without break. Gunpowder weapons advanced more quickly in Europe 
and were imported into East Asia as they became available.
Both the Western way of war and the Military Revolution hypothesis 
required simple models of culture, technology and warfare. The collapse of 
the military revolution hypothesis, undermined just as much from the western 
side as from the comparative China side, parallels the collapse of the western 
way of war. 50 More detailed studies of warfare, western and non-western, 
demonstrated that these simple models were broadly and fundamentally 
inaccurate, making these positions untenable. The old paradigms, the Chinese 
48. Lorge (2008).
49. Swope (2009).
50. Parker’s book almost immediately stimulated a detailed response in Rogers (1995), 
and in that sense was never fully accepted. Jeremy Black has written many books 
concerning the subject, effectively dismantling every one of Parker’s arguments. For 
one example see Black (2011). Some scholars do continue to support Parker’s position. 
The western way of war has been systematically picked apart in its particulars by recent 
scholarship. See Kagan & Viggiano (2013), which also includes Hanson’s response. 
More telling, perhaps, was a comment Stephen Morillo made at the 2012 Society for 
Military History conference, “What do you mean by the West?”
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way in war, the Western way of war, and the Military Revolution have come to 
the end of their useful lives.
There is now a Chinese Military History Society, an academic journal, 
the Journal of Chinese Military History, and a regular presence at the annual 
meetings of the Society for Military History. Unfortunately, military history 
remains less prominent at the Association for Asian Studies meetings or in 
the Journal of Asian Studies. A small, but productive and growing number 
of scholars are publishing more and more studies of Chinese military history 
in a far more welcoming environment. New military histories like Kenneth 
Swope’s The Military Collapse of China’s Ming Dynasty, 1618-1644 (2013), 
Ulrich Theobald’s War Finance and Logistics in Late Imperial China: A Study 
of the Second Jinchuan Campaign (1771-1776) (2013) and Yingcong Dai’s 
The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing (2011), 
show a step change in the rate of production, while new translations of early 
military texts like Olivia Millburn’s The Glory of Yue (2010), Robin McNeal’s 
Conquer and Govern: Early Chinese Military Texts from the Yi Zhou Shu 
(2012) and Andrew Seth Meyers’ The Dao of the Military: Liu An’s Art of War 
(2012) provide a broader range of works beyond Sunzi. 51
Conclusion
It has now been forty years since the publication of Chinese Ways in Warfare. 
At that time, there was very little Chinese military history available in the West 
or East Asia and only a slightly larger amount available on Chinese military 
thought. The general consensus was that war was not important in Chinese 
history or culture, the Chinese had a unique way of warfare that deemphasized 
force in favor of clever stratagems, and Sunzi presented an “indirect approach” 
to strategy that contrasted with the western “direct approach” described by 
Clausewitz. This consensus fed into explanations of why China’s lead in 
gunpowder weapons did not translate into the modern period, and why its 
culture went into relative decline with respect to the West in the 19th century. 
Ideas about the place of warfare in Chinese history were directly connected to 
broader interpretations of both Chinese and Western history.
Chinese military history has thus inherited a leverage point where it can 
inluence the interpretations of Chinese history, early modern Western history, 
and world history. China’s long tradition of history writing is unequaled by 
51. Theobald (2013); Yingcong Dai (2011); Millburn (2010); McNeal (2012); Meyer 
(2012).
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any other culture, making it the natural comparison for any argument about 
historical development. This same history-writing tradition provided a much 
fuller description of the past, where wars and military matters were an important 
part of what happened but not the entirety of the account. The Western historical 
tradition was much smaller and proportionally more occupied with warfare. It 
is not that the West was more militarily oriented, or China less so, but rather 
that a historiographical artifact has made it seem so.
If we can now see China as no less martial in its history, then we can begin 
to examine much more nuanced historical questions. All Chinese dynasties 
were created through immense wars, yet, unlike in the West, some of those 
dynasties lasted for three or four centuries. For reasons still unexplained, the 
Chinese were often much better at using warfare to create stable political 
entities controlling large territories than, for example, Western Europeans 
after the Roman empire fell. Chinese dynasties did not simply come into being 
without effort or violence, nor was their collapse an unnatural disordering of 
fundamental Chinese unity and peace. Violence was one of the most important 
means for creating and maintaining dynasties. When a leader or group of leaders 
applied it skillfully they could create an empire and dynasty and maintain 
themselves in the face of internal or external threats. Chinese dynasties rose 
and fell on their ability to use violence effectively. This is an unpleasant fact, 
but no less true for all our reluctance to accept that the Chinese did not have a 
special power to wield political power without force.
Chinese military history has become part of the discipline of military 
history and is contributing to a new, broader and more inclusive approach to 
the subject. The rise of Chinese military history has fortunately occurred at a 
time of dynamic change in western military history. Military history itself has 
gained greater acceptance among academic historians, or at least somewhat less 
resistance, and it is important for China to have a military history too. As China 
gains a military history, it will become a more “normal” subject of comparison 
rather than an exotic and abstract other. It will cease to be that strange place 
where wars didn’t happen and the elites had no interest in military matters, yet 
it somehow invented perhaps the most consequential military technology in 
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